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Model checking has been used to verify the correctness of digital circuits, security protocols, com-
munication protocols, as they can be modelled by means of finite state transition model. However,
modelling the behaviour of hybrid systems like UAVs in a Kripke model is challenging. This work
is aimed at capturing the behaviour of an UAV performing cooperative search mission into a Kripke
model, so as to verify it against the temporal properties expressed in Computational Tree Logic
(CTL). SMV model checker is used for the purpose of model checking.
1 Introduction
Increase in computational power, improvements in control techniques and other technological advances
have led to increased focus on cooperative control of multiple agents in recent years. Cooperating multi-
agent systems find application in large number of areas - mobile robots, micro satellite clusters, un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs), automated highway systems and internet agents. Cooperating multiple-
agents offer a large number of benefits such as: increase in the success rate of mission, large area coverage
by improvements in latency and information gathering, increase in the computational power offered by
distributed computing and graceful degradation in performance
Cooperative UAV control problems that have received recent attention include cooperative formation
[18], cooperative task allocation, cooperative path planning, cooperative search and many others. Co-
operative search problems have applications in a number of military and civilian applications, such as
surveillance and reconnaissance operations, search and rescue; hazard monitoring, battle damage assess-
ment, agricultural coverage tasks and security patrols [26].
Due to the mission critical nature of UAV systems, it is highly important to ensure the correctness
of these systems and check if the system meets the design requirements. The failure of control software
of the Arian-5 rocket and the Mars rover are hard remainders of what can happen when systems don’t
perform as per specifications. Verification is the process of verifying the correctness of the system
and whether it satisfies the specifications. The common verification processes are simulation, testing,
deductive verification, and model checking [15]. Simulation is performed on the abstract model of the
system, where as testing is done on the actual system. Simulation and testing involve giving certain
inputs and checking whether the outputs are as expected. These methods are cost effective way to find
the errors. However, checking all of the possible interactions and possible faults is almost impossible
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using simulation and testing. They only ensure that the system works for the inputs they are tested for.
Testing will demonstrate the presence of bugs, but will not demonstrate the absence of bugs. Even if the
system passes all the testing, we can’t claim that the system is completely free from errors, as no amount
of testing is exhaustive enough.
The mission planning software of multiple UAV systems involves concurrency as it deals with mul-
tiple UAVs. It is also reactive, as it constantly interacts with the environment in which the UAVs operate.
It is impossible to completely verify such a software system using traditional testing. In addition, concur-
rency bugs are one of the most difficult ones to test in a traditional way. Moreover, autonomous systems
operate in harsh and unpredictable environments and it is difficult to predict before hand the kind of
situations that may arise during the mission to carry out testing [8] [6] [3]. Hence, there is a need for
formal verification methods, like deductive verification and model checking, which can clarify with high
degree of certainty that the system meets its requirements. NASA has been working on developing for-
mal verification techniques for their intelligent autonomous system involving multiple rovers or satellites
[9] [19].
Deductive verification is proof-based. It refers to axioms and proof rules to prove the correctness
of the system. System description is made in some formal language and leads to a set Γ of appropriate
formulas in an appropriate logic. The set Γ constitutes a formal logical inference system for deduction.
A system specification is an another formula ϕ of a chosen logic. The verification consists of finding a
proof within the given formal logical system, which would demonstrate that the specification formula ϕ
is inferred from the axioms and inference rules of the formal system Γ, ie Γ |= ϕ . The formal system Γ
is assumed to be sound and complete. Deductive verification is well recognized in computer scientists
and has significantly influenced the area of software development. However, deductive verification is
time-consuming and can be performed only by experts in logic and mathematics.
Model checking, as the name suggests, is model-based. It is an automatic technique for verifying
finite state systems. It involves developing a simplified model which captures the essential features of
the systems. The specifications which are to be verified on the system are specified, usually in terms
of logical statements. Then a model checker, a software tool, systematically examines all the system
scenarios to check whether the system satisfies the specifications [5].
In [11] SPIN model checker has been used to verify the safety properties of multi-robot system
expressed in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). In [20] timed automata has been used to model the robots
and Upaal model checker has been used to verify the properties of multiple-robot system expressed in
Computational Tree Logic (CTL). This paper presents formal modelling of multiple-UAV mission by
means of Kripke model and verification of some of the mission properties expressed in CTL. Kripke
model offers benefits of using graph theoretic approaches to analyze the system model. SMV model
checker is used for verifying the properties, as it is one of the most popular model checkers that supports
CTL. In our previous work [23], we reported Kripke model of the behaviour of a single UAV performing
a search and verification of its properties expressed in CTL.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section-2 gives an overview of model checking tech-
nique. The multiple UAV mission and single UAV behaviour performing the search are discussed in
Section-3. Verification of the UAV behaviour using SMV model checker is presented in Section-4.
2 Overview of Model Checking
Model checking is a technique to verify finite state machine abstraction of the system. The system is
represented by finite state model M and a temporal logic formula φ expressing some desired specification.
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A model checker is used to check M against the specification φ . The model checkers outputs either true,
if M satisfies φ i.e M |= φ , or a counter example, if it does not. These different steps of model checking
are discussed in detail below.
2.1 Model
The first step in model checking is to construct a formal model of the system. As model checking can
be performed only on finite state systems, the system should be represented as a finite state transition
diagram. We are primarily concerned with reactive systems like UAV systems and their behaviour over
time. Reactive systems are systems which maintain constant interaction with the environment in which
they operate. The family of reactive systems include many classes of programs whose correct and reliable
construction is particularly challenging, including concurrent programs, embedded and process control
programs, and operating systems. Typical examples of such systems are air traffic control systems,
operating systems, and perpetual ongoing processes such as a nuclear reactors.
Reactive systems need to interact with the environment frequently and often do not terminate. There-
fore, they can’t be adequately modelled by input-output behaviour. Reactive systems can be modelled
by capturing the features by means of state. A state is an instantaneous description of the system that
captures the variables at a particular instant of time. The change from one state to the other as a result
of some action determines the transition of the system. A computation is an infinite sequence of states
where each state is obtained from the previous state by some transition.
Kripke structure or Kripke model is a type of state transition graph to capture this intuition about the
behaviour of reactive systems. Kripke structure consists of a set of states, a set of transitions between
the states, and a function that labels each state with a set of properties that are true in that state. Paths
in Kripke structure model computations of the system. Although the model of the system is abstract and
simple, it should be expressive enough to capture the aspects of temporal behaviour for reasoning about
the system. Formal representation of Kripke structure is given below.
A Kripke model is represented by a triplet M = (S,R,L) over a set of atomic propositions AP [15].
A concise representation of a Kripke model whose nodes are states is shown in Figure 1.
1. S is a finite set of states.
2. R⊆ S×S is the transition relation.
3. L : S→ 2AP is a function that labels each state with the set of atomic propositions true in that state.
p,q
rq, r
S0
S1
S2
Figure 1: Kripke model representation of a finite state system
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2.2 Specification
The properties of the system are usually specified in temporal logic. Temporal logic is a formalism for
describing sequences of transitions between states in a reactive system. It is used for specifying and
verifying the correctness of digital circuits and computer programs. In classical logic, such as predicate
logic, the truth value of a statement is independent of time, whereas in temporal logic the truth value
changes dynamically with time. As we are trying to capture the behaviour of multiple UAV group
over time, temporal logic suits the purpose of specification language for specifying requirements of the
system. There are two fundamental representation types of temporal logic: CTL and LTL. The distinction
is how they handle the underlying computation tree.
CTL considers branching of time and allows future paths at any given point of time. The temporal
operators quantify over the paths that are possible from a given state. The CTL operators are AX, EX,
AG, EG, AU, EU, AF and EF. These operators are pairwise operators. The first of the pair is either A
or E. A represents ‘along all paths’ and E represents ‘there exists at least one path’. The second one of
the pair is X, F, G, or U meaning ‘next state’, ‘some future state’, ‘all future states(globally)’ and ‘until’
respectively. CTL has the following syntax given in Backus Naur form:
φ :=⊥|⊤|p|(φ)|(¬φ)|(φ ∧φ)|(φ ∨φ)|φ → φ |AXφ |EXφ |A[φ ∪φ ]|E[φ ∪φ ]|AGφ |EGφ |AFφ |EFφ , (1)
where p ranges over atomic formulas.
2.3 Verification
Many automatic model checkers are available, e.g. SMV [16], SPIN[10], KRONOS, HYTECH, NuSMV.
SMV model checker has been developed by McMillan in the 90s. It uses SMV language for description
of the system model. It accepts temporal specifications expressed either in CTL or LTL. SMV has been
used for model checking digital circuits [12], security protocols [14], embedded systems [13] and web
applications [17].
3 Mission planning for Multiple UAVs
In recent years there has been a growing interest in employing UAV teams to cooperatively search a given
area. The operations of such groups include reconnaissance, surveillance, battle damage assessment,
fire monitoring and chemical cloud detection. UAVs are suitable for these operations as they are too
dangerous for human pilots. Some of the tasks such as monitoring forest fire propagation and mapping
chemical cloud propagation can only be carried out by a group of UAVs and can’t be carried out by a
single UAV [21], [7], [25], [26].
Hierarchical approach is used extensively for cooperative control because of its simplicity and ease
of design [21] [1] [24]. Each layer has different functionalities. This is done to simplify design and
to deal with different aspects of the systems in separate layers. Partitioning may result in sub-optimal
solution, but as each of these layers have different bandwidths dealing them separately can be justified.
The decision making layer operates at very low rate, whereas the path planning layer operates at moderate
rate and auto-pilot operates at high rate. The control architecture for multiple UAV mission is shown in
Figure 2. The top layer performs as decision making layer taking inputs regarding the state of the UAVs
from the middle layer. The middle layer is the path planning and guidance layer. The bottom layer
consists of controllers for each UAV.
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Figure 2: Architecture for multiple-UAV cooperative control
3.1 Cooperative UAV Search
This research is aimed at developing a verifiable multiple UAV mission for cooperatively searching a
given area. The mission is to search a given bounded area for static targets and threats using a group
of UAVs for the purpose of environmental monitoring. No or little information is available about the
area being searched. The UAVs must cooperatively search the environment and mark the positions of
targets and threats. Each UAV has a communication link to broadcast the findings and to receive updates
from other UAVs of the group. Each UAV has sensors to monitor the environment for the presence of
threats and targets. It is assumed that inter-UAV communications are instantaneous, noiseless and have
unbounded communication range. It is assumed that each UAV has sufficient processing power for path
planning and enough storage to store the global picture of the area being searched. The velocity of the
UAVs is 20 m/s and the minimum turn radius is 25 m.
Each UAV stores on board a model of the environment in form of a “search map”. The positions of
targets, positions of threats identified by the UAVs in the group and decisions of the other UAVs in the
group are stored in this search map. This search map is constantly updated to reflect new information
gathered and changes in the state of the UAVs. Sharing information is essential to ensure cooperation
for decentralized control approach [2], [26]. As no centralized control is present, sharing of information
among the UAVs helps in achieving cooperation. The environment being searched is divided into square
cells. Based on the information in search map each UAV will identify an adjacent cell free from threats
and other UAVs. The path planning layer generates a path starting from its present position, to the
selected neighbouring cell with selected intial and destination headings.
The area to be searched is a square area of 2000X2000 metres. The area is discretized into square
cells of 100x100 metres. Discretizing the area into cells helps in reducing the state space and also to
visualize the state of location of the UAV. Each cell is identified by coordinates of the centre of cell.
The UAVs move through the search area by selecting one of the neighbouring cells. The neighbouring
five cells around the cell, in which UAV is flying, are marked as shown in Figure 3 for the purpose of
identification. The cell with arrow corresponds to the cell in which the UAV is flying at the time of
decision making and the direction of arrow indicates the current heading of the UAV. Cell marked with 1
corresponds to the cell just ahead in the direction of current heading. When cell1 is free, the UAV moves
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Figure 3: Neighbouring cells marked for decision making
into it. If cell1 contain a threat or it is already chosen by other UAV in the group, the UAV moves into
cell3. The order of preference in selecting a neighbouring cell in decreasing order is - cell1, cell3, cell5,
cell2 and cell4. When the UAV reaches the north-most cell it moves into cell5. When the UAV reaches
the south-most cell it moves into cell4. The UAV flies in a path which connects the centre of present cell
and the centre of the chosen neighbouring cell. The initial heading and destination headings of the path
are either 90◦ or 270◦. This is done to discretize the heading of the UAV to just two values in order to
capture the UAV heading in finite state transition model. The heading is measured with respect to the
east. Heading of 90◦ corresponds to the UAV flying north. The destination heading of the path is same
as the initial heading if the UAV selects cell1 or cell2 or cell3. If not, the destination heading is opposite
direction to the initial heading. Each UAV in the group repeats this behaviour of selecting a neighbouring
free cell.
The decision making layer passes the information of the current and destination cells, current and
destination headings to the path planning layer as shown in Figure 4. The path planning layer takes inputs
from the decision making layer and generates a flyable path from the current cell to the destination cell
with specified starting heading and destination heading. The flight dynamics of the UAV are not taken
into account. It is assumed that the flight controller present on the UAV will take inputs from the path
planning and guidance layer and follows the generated path.
Decision Making
Path Planning
Current and destination cell 
coordinates
Initial and destination 
headings
Position Information
Figure 4: Information exchange between decision making layer and path planning layer
Dubins paths are used to generate path between the way points identified by the decision making
layer. The decision making layer passes the inputs to the path planning layer which then produces
a Dubins path for the initial and destination poses. Dubins path produces the shortest path between
two points by concatenation of circular arcs and their connecting tangents [4] [22]. A straight line is
the shortest path between two points. However, for UAVs with constraints on initial heading and final
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heading and minimum turning radius, the shortest path is given by concatenation of circular arcs and
straight line [4]. Four Dubins curve types LRL, RSR, RSL, LSR have been used. L, S, R denote turning
left, straight line and turning right respectively. It is assumed that the UAVs fly with a constant altitude.
Hence, 2D Dubins paths are used for path planning. 2D Dubins paths for different turning radii and
different heading angles are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: 2D Dubins paths for different turning radii and heading angles
The search strategy discussed above is implemented in MATLAB. The trajectories of two UAVs in the
group for a flying time of 600 seconds is shown in Figure 6. The red dots indicate the cells with threats.
Figure 6: Simulation result of multiple UAV mission
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4 Model Checking UAV Misssion
4.1 Kripke Model of UAV Mission
The behaviour of an UAV in the group performing the mission has been captured in Kripke model. CTL
has been used to specify the properties because of its expressiveness and ease of modelling in Kripke
model. As SMV model checker is a popular model checker for checking CTL properties is has been
chosen for our work. SMV language is used for the description of the corresponding Kripke model.
The state of the UAV is captured by the current values of the programs variables. The state of the
position of the UAV is captured by means of the coordinates of the centre of the cell. State variables
current cell and destination cell capture the present and destination cell coordinates respec-
tively. The initial values for current cell, initial heading are assigned using the keyword init
as shown in Figure 7. The movement of the UAV from one cell to the next cell is modelled by assigning
init(current_cell) := [10 , 10];
init(initial_heading):=90;
Figure 7: SMV code showing assignment of initial values
one of the five neighbouring cells to the state variable cell. The state variables initial heading and
destination heading capture the initial and destination headings of the UAV path connecting the
present cell and the destination cell. The destination heading of the path becomes the initial heading for
the next path and the destination cell becomes current cell, once the UAV moves to the destination cell.
The SMV code modelling these transitions is shown in the Figure 8.
next(initial_heading) := destination_heading;
next(current_cell) := destination_cell;
Figure 8: SMV code showing transitions
The state variables north cell and south cell model the inputs from the navigation system re-
garding the present position of the UAV in the search area. The values for north cell and south cell
are assigned deterministically as shown in the Figure 9. The state variables like threat in cell1model
north_cell := case
current_cell[2]=1950:1;
1:0;
esac;
south_cell := case
current_cell[2]=50:1;
1:0;
esac;
Figure 9: SMV code showing assignment
the environment in which the UAV is operating and model the presence of threats around the UAV. As
these variables are purely environmental and the UAV has no control over the location of threats, they
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are declared as non-deterministic. The state variables like other uav selected cell1 model the de-
cisions made by other UAVs in the group. These variables are declared as non-deterministic, as the
decisions of the other UAVs are not determined by the state of UAV. As the UAV’s decisions are based
on the information from the sensors which senses the presence of threats in the immediate neighbour-
hood, only five cells around the UAV are considered as shown in the Figure 3. For example the presence
of threat in the cell11 is modelled by assigning value 1 to the boolean state variable threat in cell1.
The movement of the other UAVs in the group are captured by the boolean state variables. For example
the selection of the any UAV in the group to move into cell1 is modelled by assigning 1 to the state
variable other uav selected cell1.
The destination heading is either 90◦ or 270◦ based on the present heading and the destination cell
chosen. The coordinates of the destination cell depend on the selection of the neighbouring cell and
the coordinates of the current cell. A snippet of SMV code showing the assignment of destination cell
coordinates to the state variable destination cell is shown in the Figure 10.
destination_cell:=
case
cell=cell1 : case
initial_heading =90 : [current_cell[1] , current_cell[2]+100];
initial_heading =270: [current_cell[1] , current_cell[2]-100];
esac;
cell=cell2 : ..
..
..
..
..
esac;
Figure 10: SMV code showing assignment of destination cell coordinates
4.2 Specification and Verification of Properties
CTL is used to express the properties that the UAV mission is expected to satisfy. The property that
“when the UAV is flying with a heading of 90◦ and not in the north-most cell, then it flies straight when
there is no threat ahead and no other UAV has chosen cell1” is expressed by the formula:
AG(initial heading= 90∧¬threat in cell1∧¬other uav selected cell1∧
¬north cell→ cell = cell1)
Similarly, formula for the case when the UAV heading is 270◦ is expressed as:
AG(initial heading= 270∧¬threat in cell1∧¬other uav selected cell1∧
¬south cell→ cell= cell1)
The safety property that “the UAV doesn’t enter a cell when either a threat is present or other UAV
in the group has already chosen to enter that cell” is specified by the following formula for the case of
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cell1:
AG(threat in cell1∨other uav selected cell1→¬(cell= cell1))
The property that “the UAV has a initial heading of either 90◦ or 270◦ in its path” is expressed by
the following formula
AG(initial heading= 90∨initial heading= 270)
The Kripke model is verified against the above properties using SMV model checker. Intel 2.2 Ghz
processor is used for verificaion and resources used are: user time of 0.046875 sec and system time of
0.015625 sec. SMV produced a output of true for all the above properties. The situation when the UAV
is deadlocked and cannot decide where to move next is found by means of violation of the property that
“the UAV chooses one of the five neighbouring cells”. This property can be expressed in CTL as the
following formula
AG(¬(cell= no free cell))
The violation of the above property is simulated and the Figure 11 shows a case when the UAV is
deadlocked and cannot move any further, as all the neighbouring cells contain threats.
Figure 11: Simulation of a case showing deadlock
5 Conclusion and Future Work
The behaviour of an UAV performing multiple-UAV cooperative search is modelled by Kripke model and
some of the properties of the mission are expressed in CTL. SMV model checker is used for verifying
the correctness of the model against the temporal specifications. A deadlock has been found and the
trace generated by SMV has been simulated. In future, concurrency issues, properties like area coverage,
liveness, reachability and fairness have to be verified.
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